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Author - Maka Pono

LIFE Protocol Public Threat Model

Security Assumptions, Risks, and Non-Goals

Purpose of This Document​

This document defines the public threat model for the LIFE Protocol.

Its purpose is to:

  • state explicit security assumptions
  • describe realistic threat categories
  • clarify what LIFE is designed to resist
  • clarify what LIFE is not designed to prevent

This document is intentionally non-exhaustive and non-operational. It does not disclose enforcement mechanisms, internal thresholds, or sensitive implementation details.

It exists to support:

  • government review
  • security audits
  • institutional adoption
  • long-term trust

Security Philosophy​

LIFE does not pursue absolute security. Instead, LIFE pursues resilient security, grounded in:

  • separation of powers
  • minimization of trust
  • explicit consent
  • graceful failure
  • long-term survivability

The protocol assumes that some components will fail and is designed so that failure does not collapse the system.

Core Security Assumptions​

LIFE is built on the following assumptions:

  • Devices will be lost or compromised
  • Applications may behave maliciously or negligently
  • Infrastructure operators may be coerced
  • Institutions may change priorities over time
  • Adversaries will gain access to advanced tooling
  • Cryptographic primitives will evolve

Security is therefore achieved structurally, not by secrecy or perfection.

Threat Categories Considered by LIFE​

1. Platform Capture​

Threat A platform attempts to own identity, lock in users, or silently expand authority.

LIFE Mitigation

  • No custodial identity
  • Explicit, scoped delegation
  • Right to exit
  • Proof-based interaction

Residual Risk User education and interface design remain critical.

2. Surveillance and Correlation Attacks​

Threat An actor attempts to infer identity or behavior across contexts.

LIFE Mitigation

  • Contextual separation
  • Multiple wallets and environments
  • No global identifiers
  • Consent-based disclosure

Residual Risk Direct voluntary disclosure can create correlation; LIFE does not prevent self-disclosure.

3. Malicious Applications​

Threat An application requests excessive permissions or misuses granted authority.

LIFE Mitigation

  • Explicit scope declaration
  • Revocable authority
  • Proof verification without retention

Residual Risk Users may consent to poor requests; LIFE does not override human choice.

4. Compromised Infrastructure Actors​

Threat Witnesses or watchers are compromised or coerced.

LIFE Mitigation

  • Separation of roles
  • No single point of authority
  • Attestation without enforcement
  • Replaceability of infrastructure

Residual Risk Temporary service degradation may occur; continuity is preserved.

5. Credential Theft and Device Loss​

Threat Keys or devices are stolen or destroyed.

LIFE Mitigation

  • Rotation as a normal operation
  • Recovery as first-class
  • No identity bound to a single device

Residual Risk Recovery depends on participant-defined mechanisms.

6. Economic Exploitation​

Threat Value systems are manipulated through speculation, leverage, or custodial risk.

LIFE Mitigation

  • Redeemability over liquidity engineering
  • Non-custodial value control
  • Explicit payment proofs

Residual Risk Market behavior remains outside protocol control.

Threat Institutions attempt to compel disclosure, control, or enforcement through technical means.

LIFE Mitigation

  • Separation of evidence from enforcement
  • No protocol-level compliance logic
  • Lawful processes remain external

Residual Risk Lawful orders may compel participants directly; LIFE does not block courts.

Explicit Non-Goals (Critical Clarity)​

LIFE is not designed to:

  • prevent all coercion
  • guarantee anonymity in all circumstances
  • override lawful court orders
  • prevent users from making bad choices
  • enforce moral or social outcomes
  • eliminate the need for trust entirely

Claiming otherwise is a misrepresentation of LIFE.

Failure Modes and Graceful Degradation​

When components fail, LIFE is designed so that:

  • identity continuity remains intact
  • authority can be revoked or rotated
  • infrastructure can be replaced
  • no permanent lock-in occurs

Failure should be recoverable, not catastrophic.

Long-Term Security Horizon​

LIFE is designed for a world where:

  • cryptography evolves
  • institutions change
  • adversaries improve

Therefore:

  • interfaces are stable
  • internals are replaceable
  • assumptions are documented
  • enforcement is private

Canonical Security Statement​

LIFE does not promise perfect security. It promises bounded risk, explicit trust, and recoverable failure.

Status​

This Public Threat Model is normative. It informs:

  • security reviews
  • government assessments
  • institutional adoption
  • future extensions